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INTRODUCTION

"What ever happened to 'Hands off the Net?'

"'

Back in the 1990s, Internet communications policy was easier. It
was easy to agree that the network's growth ought not be impended by
excessive government regulation. It was easy to hope that the Internet
would solve all of its own problems. Yet it turned out that the success of
the network was hiding strong differences of opinion. Today, the
euphoria is gone, and the divide in Internet communications policy has
become clear and unmistakable. It most clearly a divide between two
distinct groups: the self-proclaimed "Openists" and "Deregulationists."
This divide will do much to inform the reform of the
Telecommunications Act in general, and Broadband policy in particular.
* Visiting Professor, Columbia Law School, Associate Professor, University of Virginia
School of Law. My thanks to participants at the 2004 Silicon Flatirons conference, and the
March 26, 2004 Policy Forum "The Future Of The Internet In The Broadband Age"
organized by the Consumer Federation of America and the Stanford Center for Internet and
Society. Specific thanks for comments from Phil Weiser and Mark Cooper, discussions with
Jim Speta, Christopher Yoo and Mark Lemley, and to Lee Kovarksy for research assistance.
1. Adam Thierer, CongressionalTech Agenda for Rest of Year =JustMore Regulation,
THE TECHNOLOGY LIBERATION FRONT (Sept. 7, 2004), at http://www.techliberation.com/
archives/014257.php.
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Accordingly, this Article is meant as a user's guide to the broadband
policy debate: a guide to what separates us, and what might make
reconciliation possible. It is optimistic that policy reconciliation is
possible, though aware that saying so doesn't make it likely.
The summary of the debate is critical. I fault the Openists for being
too prone to favor regulation without making clear the connection
between ends and means. For example, too few Openists have asked the
degree to which the structural "open access" remedies pushed by
independent service providers actually promote the Openists' vision.2
Meanwhile, I fault the Deregulationists for two reasons. First, the
Deregulationists have overlooked the fact that limiting government, as
they desire, sometimes requires government action. Remedies like
network neutrality, for reasons I suggest, may be as important for control
of government as of industry. I also fault the Deregulationists for an
exaggerated faith in industry decision-making. I suggest that some
Deregulationists have failed to familiarize themselves with the processes
of industry decision-making before demanding deference to it. This is a
particularly serious problem given that the telecommunications industry
has a recent track record of terrible judgment and even outright fraud.
An important example is the demand of some Deregulationists that
deference is due to a so-called "smart pipe" vision, without analysis of
whether that vision has any independent merit.
The article, finally, explores a reconciliation of the broadband
debate with the network neutrality principle as a starting point.
Deregulations and Openists, while divided along many lines, share a
common faith in innovation as the basis of economic growth. Both
sides, in short, worship Joseph Schumpeter and his ideas of competitive,
capitalistic innovation. Fidelity to this shared faith should mean mutual
surrender of idealized models of either government or powerful private
entities, respectively, in exchange for a shared cynicism. We should
recognize that both government and the private sector have an unhappy
record of blocking the new in favor of the old, and that such tendencies
are likely to continue.
The
Reconciliation, I (optimistically) believe, is possible.
Deregulationist and Openist ought remember their common dedication
to a single principle: free and unmediated market entry, symbolized by
the rubber-cup of Hush-A-Phone.3 It is by returning to such points of
consensus that the reconciliation of communications policy can begin.

2. See also Tim Wu, Network Neutral'4 Broadband Discrimination, 2 J. ON
TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 141 (2003) (expanding on this point).
3. See Hush-A-Phone Corp. v. United States, 238 F.2d 266, 269 (D.C. Cir. 1956)
(holding that the FCC cannot block the attachment of reasonable network attachments,
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I argue that neither Deregulationists or Openists should have reason
to oppose Network Neutrality rules that create rights in users to use the
applications or equipment of their choice. This is a position that many
Deregulationists, including FCC Chairman Michael Powell, have come
to endorse. What both sides should want in an inevitable regulatory
framework for broadband are rules that pre-commit both industry and
government to open market entry. It must be remembered that rules
creating rights in users also guarantee the right of operators to enter the
application market, free of government hindrance. For these and other
reasons discussed below, limited network neutrality rules should on
reflection be attractive to both sides.
Section I describes the emergent divide in the visions of the future
that underlie today's policy divisions. Section II explains some of what
unites and divides in the economics of the Deregulationists. Section III
argues for broadband reconciliation premised on user rights to access the
content, applications and equipment of their choice.
I.

VISIONS OF THE FUTURE

Communications theorists, like everyone else, have their visions of
an ideal future that drive more of their arguments than they would like to
admit. While the theorist's utopia has much less sand and sunshine than
the average person's, its importance is nonetheless axiomatic.
A.

The Openists

In the communications world some technologies attract what you
might call a high chatter to deployment ratio. That means the volume of
talk about the technology exceeds, by an absurd ratio, the actual number
of deployments. "Videophones" are a great historical example, as is
"Video-on-Demand" and, of course, the glacial sixth version of the
Internet protocol (IPv6). In the 1990s, the technology named Voice over
IP (VoIP) was a starring member of this suspect class. The technology
promises carriage of voice signals using Internet technology, an attractive
idea, and in the 1990s and the early 2000s it was discussed endlessly
despite minimal deployment.
The discussion usually centered on the question: when would
broadband carriers deploy VoIP? And the answer was always, "not quite
yet." There were reasons. Many within the industry argued that VoIP
was not a viable technology without substantial network improvements.
Engineers said that the Internet Protocol was too inconsistent to
guarantee voice service of a quality that any customer would buy.
namely the "Hush-A-Phone" device that attached to a handset and insulated telephone
conversations against background noise).
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Industry regulatory strategists, meanwhile, were concerned that offering
voice service would attract federal regulation like honey attracts bees. As
for the Bell companies, the main Digital Subscriber Line (DSL)
providers, there was always the problem of providing a service that might
cannibalize the industry's most profitable service.
But everyone was watching the wrong companies, for where
broadband operators were timid, a company named Vonage was brave.
In late 2003 Vonage leapfrogged the broadband operators and began
selling VoIP directly to large volumes of customers. Vonage did so not
by cooperating with broadband operators but avoiding them. It sold a
plug-in device: an actual telephone that connects directly into the
network and provided phone service for a fraction of the normal cost. It
is true that the quality of the Vonage connection was not, to a
telecommunications engineer, strictly of the same quality as that available
on a traditional phone network. Yet Vonage's quality was fine to an
American people schooled by cell phones; its many users claim they
cannot tell the difference. Vonage, offered what everyone said no one
would buy, and became the Internet's success story of 2004. 4
The Vonage story captures much of the Openist's vision of what the
Internet revolution has meant for communications policy. Without
Vonage, VoIP would have arrived on the carrier's schedule: later or
perhaps never.
Vonage shows why Openists see the nation's
communications network important, first and foremost, as an innovation
commons-a resource for innovators from anywhere to draw upon.' The
Openist credo is to care about the nation's communications
infrastructure, not so much of itself, but for how it catalyzes the nation's
economic and creative potential. Vonage was free to enter the market
with a new way of selling voice service only because the network is open,
its standards as "free as the air to common use."
The Openist's theory of an innovation commons can be broken into
three prescriptive principles. The first is the Infrastructureprinciple. It
is an insistence that the most important purpose of a communications
network is as public infrastructure, with particular meaning attached to
that concept. It means that the principal value of the network is indirect:
it as a source of positive spillovers, or externalities, that enable the work
of others. It suggests that the highest potential of the network will be
achieved not by the accomplishments of network owners but by what
creative users and developers can do with a fast and reliable connection

4. See Stephen Wildstrom, At Last, You Can Ditch The Phone Company VOIP Lets
You Make Clear, Fast Calls Over The Net, Using A Plain Phone, BUS. WK., May 17, 2004,
at 26.
5. See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, The Internet Under Siege, FOREIGN POL'Y, Nov. 1,
2001, available at http://www.lessig.org/content/columns/foreignpolicyl.pdf.
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between every human on earth.
One way of understanding this vision of the network as
"infrastructure" is to contrast it directly with its foil, the idea that a
network is a "service" or "product" sold by a company. At the podium at
the 2004 Silicon Flatirons Conference, speaker Mark Cooper put this
product/infrastructuredistinction in vivid terms:
The proprietary platform folks are talking about a BETA Max, an
Atari and an Xbox;
I am talking a general purpose technology, a cumulative, systemic
technology, like the railroad, electricity or the telephone.
For them the end-to-end principle is an obscure garden variety
interface;
For me it is a fundamental design principle of an enabling
technology.
When they analyze the proprietary standards wars, there are few if
any externalities;
When I analyze a bearer service like the digital communications
platform, externalities dominate.6
The second principle is the Neutrality principle. It holds that to
reach its highest potential, a communications infrastructure must not
discriminate as between uses, users, or content. As FCC Commissioner
Michael Copps puts it: "From its inception, the Internet was designed, as
those present during the course of its creation will tell you, to prevent
government or a corporation or anyone else from controlling it. It was
7
designed to defeat discrimination against users, ideas and technologies."
The third principle is the End-to-End(e2e) principle. Whatever its
meaning elsewhere,' in broadband policy e2e stands for a theory of

6. Mark Cooper, Remarks at the Silicon Flatirons Telecommunications Program
Conference, University of Colorado School of Law (Feb. 8, 2004) (transcript available from
the Silicon Flatirons Telecommunications Program, http://www.silicon-flatirons.org)
[hereinafterCooper Remarks].
7. See FCC Commissioner Michael J. Copps, The Beginning of the End of the
Internet? Discrimination, Closed Networks, and the Future of Cyberspace, Address Before the
at
available
(transcript
9,
2003)
(Oct.
Foundation
American
New
http://www.newamerica.net/Download Docs/pdfs/DocsFile_194_l.pdf).
8. In the telecommunications industry, the term "end-to-end" is used for a variety of
purposes, many of which are quite meaningless, or roughly synonymous with "good." See, e.g.,
MOTOROLA, INC., MOTOROLA NEXT LEVEL COMMUNICATIONS, END-TO-END, at
(last visited Jun. 26, 2004).
http://broadband.motorola.com/nlc/solutions/endtoend.asp
Christopher Yoo, meanwhile, writes in this volume that the end-to-end principle as originally
described by the network engineering literature has been misunderstood by Openists. See
Christopher S. Yoo, Would Mandating Broadband Network Neutraly Help or Hurt
Competition? A Comment on the End-to-End Debate, 3 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH
TECH. L. 23, 42-46 (2004).
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innovation. It rejects centralized, planned innovation, and holds that the
greatest rate of technological development is driven by delegating
decisional authority to the decentralized "ends" of any network. The
reason is fairly simple: the "ends" of the network are numerous, or nearly
unlimited, and delegating authority to the ends opens the door to more
approaches to a given technological challenge. The e2e principle
assumes that innovation is an evolutionary process, driven by contests
between competing approaches to a problem. For Openists, the e2e
principle puts as many players in the contest as possible to ensure the true
champion emerges.
Openists believe these three principles are what made the Internet
different from other communications networks; they hold that the
embedding of these principles in the design of the Internet is the essence
of the revolution. Their founder's story rejects technological
determinism, or the idea that the Internet was destined to occur. They
instead see the founding engineers, men like Paul Baran, Vint Cerf and
Robert Kahn, as heroic figures and communications revolutionaries. 9
The Openist vision just described can seem abstract to regulators
and policy-makers. For that reason, in recent years Openists have
advanced a more concrete regulatory model to explain what neutrality
would entail. That model suggests that the Internet will continue its
success if we come to understand it as a more humble but nonetheless
highly successful innovation enhancing network: the nation's electric
grid.
While today taken for granted, the electric network is probably the
greatest innovation catalyst of our age. The radio, the air conditioner,
the computer and other giant innovations have all depended on a
predictable and reliable supply of electric current.1" This multipurpose
network is like the railways of the 19th century or the first roads of ages
past: among the foundations of the national economy.
Openists point to the electrical grid and say it is successful precisely
because we don't care about electricity as a product, but care instead
about what the electric grid makes possible. It provides a standardized
platform for the development of appliances that serve human needs, such
as the hair dryer or DVD player. Sony and IBM do business safe in the
assumption that American electricity will be predictable, standardized,
and provided without preference for certain brands or products. There is
9. An example of the heroic version of the Internet's invention is KATIE HAFNER &
MATTHEW LYON, WHERE WIZARDS STAY UP LATE, THE ORIGINS OF THE INTERNET

(1996).
10. The electric grid model appears in Mark Cooper's remarks at the Silicon Flatirons
Conference. See Cooper Remarks, supra note 6; Tim Wu, Application-CenteredInternet
Anaysis, 85 VA. L. REV. 1163, 1165 (1999); see also LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND
OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE (2000).
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no built-in favoritism for the VCR over the DVD player. You do not
ask the electric companies permission before plugging in a new cordless
phone. This makes the electric grid, Openists say, one of the greatest
models of network neutrality the world has ever known.
The electric grid model returns us to the Vonage story that opened
the section. The long term vision is a future where still other services
Freestanding IPlong-centralized will finally be decentralized.
televisions, IP-stereos, and many other services should be available based
on plug-in devices, developed by independent, competing companies.
This vision, in the Openists' view, is far from inevitable. It requires
defense of the network against forces that want, for a variety of reasons,
to close the network to market entrants.
B.

The Deregulationists

The contrasting vision of the communications future begins with
the decades-old idea of media convergence. Convergence means a
natural technological progression toward a single network for
communications services. Voice, data, and video, historically carried over
different networks will, in the future, be carried over a single "pipe."
There was a time, namely the 1990s, when twin visions of "convergence"
and "commons" could maintain a peaceful coexistence. But today the
visions are rivals, for the underlying principles are in conflict.
The convergence vision focuses on the owners of the networks and
the services they will offer on the converged network "telecosm."" As
Peter Huber puts it:
Convergence among technologies is doing more than networking the
networks. It is transforming the services; the vast capacities of
broadband networks make nonsense of the traditional regulation
distinction between "carriers" and "broadcasters." . . . Broadcasters, in
short, are mastering the art of keeping the "broad" while switching
Telephone companies are keeping their switched,
the "cast."
addressable capabilities while widening their bandwidth and their
reach. Nobody casts drift nets anymore. They are all fly fishermen
now. 12
The Deregulationist position can also be reduced to several principles.
First is the Propertization principle: any given resource will generally
reach its best use when mapped out as property, and assigned owners.
When Deregulationists think "commons," the word "tragedy" is never far

11. The idea of a "telecosm" was described most vividly in GEORGE GILDER,
TELECOSM (2000).
12. PETER HUBER ET AL., FEDERAL BROADBAND LAW § 1.2.4 (1995).
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from mind. Property owners can be expected to maintain and steward
only what they have the right to exclude others from. 3 Additionally, the
creation of transferable property rights will facilitate private, welfareenhancing transactions. As Frank Easterbrook famously put it in
Cyberspace and the Law of the Hors. "we need to bring the Internet
into the world of property law.., without which welfare-increasing
bargains cannot occur. "14
The second principle is the Incentive principle, which is just a
simple reminder that communications networks are expensive
investments and that companies will only build when given the prospect
of a reasonable return on investment." To speak, as Openists do, of a
pure public infrastructure may have made some sense when the
government was funding and building the network, but by now is
seriously out-of-date. Some Deregulationists will accept that aspects of
the Internet that have the character of a public good or natural monopoly
and therefore might be best provided by an entity outside of the market
(Internet addresses might be an example). But in general, and for most
of the network and its applications, the private sector responding to
appropriate incentives will drive and fund the future.
The final principle is Deregulation itself. The Deregulationist is
naturally suspicious of government regulation outside of the assignment
of property rights. This can be understood as a different interpretation
of the Internet revolution: the greatest factor in the success of the
Internet was the fact that the Commission and Congress largely stayed
out of the way. The idea of technological destinies, discussed above, is
important to this position. Deregulationists are generally technological
realists, believing that power more than ideas determines the course of
history. Government may slow but it cannot stop the inevitable. So
while Openists may try to slow or stop it, in the long term the power of
private network owners will drive the next-generation Internet.
Much of this is as abstract as the idea of an Internet commons.
When asked for a more concrete vision of what Deregulationist policies
may lead to, Deregulationists have turned to the vision of the "smart
pipe." The smart pipe (also known as the "Quality of Service (QoS)
Internet" or the "value-added service" model) is the central dogma of
innumerable industry white papers. The basic idea is this: broadband
operators will increase revenue and profit by selling applications bundled

13. CfGarrett Hardin, The Tragedy ofthe Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968).
14. Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL
F. 207, 212-13 (1996).
15. See, e.g., ADAM D. THIERER, "NET NEUTRALITY" DIGITAL DISCRIMINATION
OR REGULATORY GAMESMANSHIP IN CYBERSPACE? (The CATO Institute, CATO Policy

Analysis No. 507, Jan. 12, 2004), available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/pa507.pdf.
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with a basic connection. Stated in industry jargon, broadband operators
using "next-generation" technologies can offer their customers a host of
"value-added" services, such as telephony, video-on-demand, and so on.' 6
The incentive for this new model, at least on the authority of projection,
is profits that far exceed what can be earned from selling "commodity
bandwidth."
Equipment vendors have pushed this vision aggressively for the last
decade. As a current Cisco White Paper instructs cable operators:
Tomorrow's cable business growth, however, will come from offering
value-added services to consumers such
as video on demand (VOD),
17
interactive TV, and cable telephony.
How? As Cisco explains to cable operators, in a FAQ rich with industry
jargon:
The Cisco MSOC solution defines a multiservice network
infrastructure for delivering HFC-based, revenue generating
enhanced IP-based services. Cisco MSOC provides best-practice
design guidelines for building a well-engineered, reliable, highly
available and quality-of-service (QoS)-enabled cable network capable
of supporting real-time sensitive applications (such as VoIP and
commercial services).... The largely untapped market for enhanced
IP-based services, beyond high-speed Internet,8 will primarily fuel the
future revenue growth for the cable operators.'
In short, the vendor industry and Deregulationists predict that the next
great wave of innovation will occur at the center of the network, not the
ends.' 9 That directly contradicts the end-to-end principle, but that's
fine: most Deregulationists believe blind adherence to the end-to-end
principle is what is in fact slowing technological progress today.
Economists Bruce Owen and Gregory Rosston, for example, argue that
openness inevitably has a price," and that certain innovations "have been

16. See, e.g., Ira Brodsky, Telecom Caiers Need to Smarter Up Their Pipes,
NETWORK WORLD FUSION, (Jan. 15, 2001), at http://www.nwfusion.com/columnists/

2001/00280817.html.
17. CISCO SYSTEMS, RESIDENTIAL CABLE SERVICES (2003), available at
http://www.cisco.com/application/pdf/en/us/guest/netsollns289/c7l4/ccmigration-09186aO08
014e05f.pdf.
18.

CISCO SYSTEMS, MULTISYSTEM OVER CABLE SOLUTIONS (2003), available at

http://www.cisco.com/en/US/netsol/ns341/ns396/ns289/ns269/netqaO9186aOO8Ol13708.htm

1.
19.

See, e.g.,

BRUCE OWEN & GREGORY ROSSTON, LOCAL BROADBAND ACCESS:

PRIMUM NON NOCERE OR PRIMUM PROCESSI?

(STAN.
L. & ECON., Olin
http://ssrn.com/abstract=431620.

Working

A

Paper

PROPERTY RIGHTS APPROACH 21

No.

263,

2003),

available

at

J ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH.L.

[Vol. 3

slowed or even blocked because of the [e2e's] requirement that the
network not have embedded intelligence." °
Finally, while Openists favor the story of the Internet founders,
Deregulationists invoke a different prescriptive saga: the birth of cable
television. As Peter Huber puts it "Cable was the prototype of the
broadband future."2 The development of the cable networks was a story
of private ingenuity's victory over governmental perfidy and, in the mind
of many Deregulationists, a story with clear lessons for broadband 2000.
The Commission in the 1960s was anxious to preserve certain ideal
visions of television. The two most important were that it be free and
that it be local. Whatever the theoretical merits of those views,
Deregulationists point out that the practical effect was to slow the spread
of cable television for a full decade and to stop it from penetrating urban
markets.22 It was only by the 1970s that the Commission finally relaxed
its grip and let competitive forces run their course. (Today cable
companies are the TV's dominant players, so much so that cable
operators rather casually bid to acquire broadcasters, their one-time
overlords.)23
This, the Deregulationists would suggest, is what's happening in
broadband policy, though our proximity makes us incapable of realizing
it. There are certain parallels that anchor the obstructionist story. First,
physical broadband networks, whether cable, twisted pair, or wireless
spectrum, are indeed the subject of intensely complex federal and state
regulation, rather like those to which the cable industry was subjected in
the late 1960s and early 1970s (one writer described the cable regulations
of 1972 as the "most complicated scheme ever devised by the mind of
man"24 ). The ongoing regulatory asymmetry of DSL, cable, and wireless
services is perhaps the most obvious example of a governmentally
introduced distortion.
Second, the Commission in this view is still attached to some
inappropriately utopian visions, which do not correspond with
technological destiny. Today, the Deregulationist would contend,
replacing "localism" and "free television" are similarly impractical ideals
20. Id. at 21.
21. PETER HUBER, LAW AND DISORDER IN CYBERSPACE 62 (1997).
22. See Leonard Chazen & Leonard Ross, Federal Regulation of Cable Television, the
Visible Hand, 83 HARV. L. REv. 1820, 1820 (1970); Stanley M. Besen & Robert W.
Crandall, The Deregulationof Cable Television, 4 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 77, 94 (1981)
("Cable entered the 1970s as a small business relegated primarily to rural areas and small
communities and held hostage by television broadcasters to the Commission's hope for the
development of UHF.").
23. See Alison Beard, Comcast Must Spell Out Plan for ABC, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 17,
2004, available at2004 WL 70205529 (discussing Comcast's planned acquisition of ABC).
24. Besen & Crandall, supra note 22, at 81-91 (documenting FCC activity constraining
the growth of cable).
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like the "end-to-end principle," "open access" and, of course "network
neutrality."
A related similarity is what Deregulationists decry as an effort to
prop up doomed businesses in the name of lofty ideals. In the 1960s, the
Commission placed much hope for the future of television in a new
generation of UHF broadcast stations." UHF stations did have many
appealing qualities: they were locally owned, free over the air for
recipients, and available in greater quantity than VHF stations. But
UHF was hopeless as a technological competitor to cable. Today,
Deregulationists contend, we see the scenario repeating itself.
Independent Internet Service Providers (ISPs) are kept alive in the vain
hope that they may somehow make the broadband world a better place.
So what is the Deregulationist's vision of the future? Some argue
that the FCC and Internet old-timers are holding back, not promoting
the natural progress of broadband networks. Innovation, they contend,
can happen anywhere, not just at the "ends." Dreams of a neutral
network may be holding back the next communications revolution, one
that will arise from the center of the network. That vision will
necessarily be driven by private network owners and will bring consumers
both what they want and are willing to pay for and what the old Internet
could never have provided.

It is between substantive visions of the future where the Openist Deregulationist divide is most stark. That is perhaps because the
contrasting utopias depend mainly on intuition and aesthetics, and faith
in the private and public sectors, respectively. Yet nonetheless the sides
are not precise opponents. Openists are primarily focused on the endsthe innovation commons. Deregulations care most about the means,
most of all wanting to prevent disastrous and long-lasting governmental
intervention. There is room, in other words, for reconciliation.

25. This was one of the arguments of the 1958 Cox Report. Kenneth Cox, The Problem
of Television Service for Smaller Communities. Staff Report to the Senate Committee on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 26 December 1958.
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SHARED ECONOMIC FAITHS

A.

Schumpeter

It is worth reemphasizing that the greatest unifying belief as
between the Openist and Deregulationist is a common idolization of
innovation. Both sides, with a few exceptions,2 6 worship at the shrine of
economist Joseph Schumpeter and admire his concept of innovation as
"creative destruction."27
The core of what is agreed upon can be stated simply. Both sides
take innovation, and not price competition, as the principle driver of
economic growth. Proximity to the industries of high technology leads
naturally to favoring or at least acknowledging what economists call
"dynamic" economic models. Both the Openists and Deregulatists do
not believe that reaching market equilibrium is a particularly attractive
ideal: instead, new companies, new services and new products are the
primary source of increased efficiency and economic growth. That belief,
for both sides, put innovation policy at the center of national economic
policy.
As Schumpeter said,
How, then, does innovation happen?
about capitalism." 28
fact
essential
the
is
"Creative Destruction
Schumpeter's "capitalist" or "competitive" theory of innovation is
centered on the "process of industrial mutation ... that incessantly
revolutionizes the economic structure from within, incessantly destroying
the old one, incessantly creating a new one." Both sides also agree with
Schumpeter that the greatest barrier to innovation is "ordinary routine."
As he put it "knowledge and habit once acquired becomes as firmly
rooted in ourselves as a railway embankment in the earth."29 As a result,
even "in the breast of one who wishes to do something new, the forces of
habit raise up and bear witness against the embryonic project." The

26. There is a dissenting Openist viewpoint that sees the value of open infrastructure
primarily in terms of providing positive social externalities as opposed to for its role in spurring
innovation. (We value open parks for walking and socializing, not because they lead to new
inventions--the same should go for the Internet). This view is well expressed in Brett M.
Frischmann, An Economic Theory of Infrastructure and Sustainable Infrastructure Commons
(2004) (working manuscript, on file with author).
27. Much as Schumpeter admired Karl Marx. See JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER,
CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 61 (1950) [hereinafter SCHUMPETER,
CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY] ("Can capitalism survive? No. I do not
think it can"). Most of his account of capitalism as a system of growth through innovation as
opposed to price competition is summarized in Ch. VII. Id
28. Id. at 83.
29. JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, A THEORY OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 84 (1961)
[hereinafterSCHUMPETER, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT].
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greatest threat is social resistance, particularly from "the groups
30
threatened by the innovation."
As I said, most Openists and Deregulationists consider themselves
Schumpeterians. With all this agreement, where do the differences
arise?
The difference between Openists and Deregulationists in
Schumpeterian terms is over who the agents of creative destruction are.
It boils down to something quite simple: the two sides have different
attitudes toward size. Many Deregulationists, like the later Schumpeter,
see large and powerful companies as the central agents of creative
destruction. Big firms are the winners, the success stories, the smartest
and strongest. For the Openists, conversely, size is not necessarily a sign
of continuing success but instead suggestive of some knack for blocking
market entry. The Openists like the early Schumpeter, and his younger
focus on the entrepreneur as the seed of creative destructive. The
difference in opinion over size can be as intractable as how one sees Sport
Utility Vehicles or modern skyscrapers. Some see a mighty work of man,
others see a wasteful monster. Yet since Schumpeter himself managed to
reconcile the role of large and small in his work, it ought be possible for
his latter-day followers.
First, the vision of the Deregulationists' Schumpeter: "What we
have got to accept" said Schumpeter in 1943, is that the "large-scale
establishment" is "the most powerful engine of [economic] progress and
in particular of the long-run expansion of total output."31 Putting faith in

"perfect competition" among numerous competitors was, in his view,
folly, for "the firm of the type that is compatible with perfect competition
is in many cases inferior in internal, especially technological, efficiency."32
The reasons for this belief can be specified more carefully. First, in
a dynamic market, when a firm successfully establishes a new market
through product innovation, the result is inevitably at least a short-term
market advantage, even a monopoly. Yet that market power is no cause
for concern, as it will erode quickly under the pressure of capitalistic
competition. Indeed, short-term monopoly profits are not a social ill but
rather social boon. For it is the very existence of potential monopoly
profit that fires the pistons of creative destruction. It is only the
possibility of a giant and seemingly unfair payoff that motivates risky and
otherwise irrational innovative behavior. Under Capitalism, Schumpeter
said, "spectacular prizes much greater than would have been necessary to
call forth the particular effort are thrown to a small minority of winners,

30.

Id.

31.

SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM & DEMOCRACY, supra note 27, at 106.

32.

Id.
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thus propelling much more effaciously than a more equal and more 'Just'
distribution would."

33

Second, large, powerful firms have advantages that in this view
make them the only entities truly capable of producing meaningful
progress. One idea, not strictly Schumpeterian, is that the large firm
with a secure market may carry out product innovation in a planned and
careful way, and decrease the waste from competing innovative
processes. 3' Another idea from Schumpeter is that large firms are simply
smarter, stronger, and better. Schumpeter argued that "there are superior
methods available to the monopolist," and that "monopolization may
increase the sphere of influence of the better, and decrease the sphere of
influence of inferior brains."35
In the broadband context, this vision sees the great firms---mainly,
the greatest of cable operators and powerful Bell Operating
Companies--as the agents of perpetual revolution. Their battle for the
giant profits that await the champion, the single broadband monopolist,
are the driving force behind broadband innovation and the future of the
Internet.
The Openists reject or temper this "naive" faith in great firms, both
with the work of Schumpeter himself, and that of later evolutionary
economists. Consider first the early, German-language Schumpeter who
spent his time on individual entrepreneurs, and the challenges they face.36
Openists think that many have misunderstood Schumpeter: that he
didn't truly believe that the large firm had an inherent advantage over the
small firm. As economist Jan Farberberg argues, "In fact, Schumpeter
seemed to be much more concerned with the difference between new and
old firms than between small and large firms."3 7 Meanwhile, the early
Schumpeter's theory of entrepreneurs is distinct and compelling. They
are to him unusual characters, risk-seeking individuals with a "special
quality," who are spread through the population like undercover
What distinguished this class of individuals, said
superheroes.
Schumpeter (foreshadowing the "open source" movement), was that
profit would be but one motive and not the most important one.
Instead, the entrepreneur was generally driven by "the dream or will to

33. Id.
34. Cf Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. &
ECON. 265 (1977).
35.

SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM & DEMOCRACY, supra note 27, at 101

36. See SCHUMPETER, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, supranote 29.
37. JAN FAGERBERG, A LAYMAN'S GUIDE TO EVOLUTIONARY ECONOMICS 15
(Centre for Technology, Innovation and Culture, Oslo, TIK Working Paper, Sept. 2002),
available at http://folk.uio.no/janf/downloadp/02fagerberg-evolution.pdf.
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found a private kingdom;" "the will to conquer: the impulse to fight, to
prove oneself superior to others" and finally the "joy of creating. " "
The Openist also directs those of Schumpeterian faith to the work
of recent evolutionary economists like Richard Nelson and Sidney
Winter. An essential element of such neo-Schumpeterian work is the
emphasis on the uncertainty and contingency and of technological
outcomes. It predicts multiple possible equilibria, rather than a single,
predictable outcome. One reason is that this branch of economic
thinking takes a much more sophisticated view of how firms decide what
to do, rejecting the premise that firms will generally arrive at
"maximizing" decisions.39 Firms instead generally depend on a set of
routines that survive unless the firm dies or manages to mutate its way of
doing business. This latter capacity is limited by the limits of humans'
ability to predict or foresee the future. There is, for writers such as
Nelson, simply too much information to process: firms will usually lack
the capacity to understand it all and understand what routines it needs to
change to arrive at the best of all possible worlds. The odds, then, of any
single actor treading the optimal path of technological development are
exceedingly low.
When cognitive limitations combine with the phenomenon, in at
least some markets, of path dependence (that is, technological "lock-in,"
or "network externalities"), 4° then reaching suboptimal technological
outcomes is not only possible but likely. Evolutionists, pace Dilbert,
consider firms to be unimaginative creatures whose ideas of the future
tends to be closely tied to the present, like the 19th century farmer who
asks for a better ox instead of a tractor. The "network" benefits of doing
business in accord with the way everyone else does it adds to the
problem. The result can quite easily become technological complacency,
the graveyard of economic growth.
Here lies the link between neo-Schumpeterian economics and the
e2e principle described in the opening section. The e2e principle can be
understood as the implementation of an evolutionary innovation policy.
E2e mandates that innovation is the job of the many (the ends), not the
few (the center).
By prescribing non-discrimination, it also sets
conditions necessary for a fair fight, so that what survives is the truly the
fittest and not merely the favored.
E2e can help erase through

38.

SCHUMPETER, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, supranote 29, at 93.
39. See, e.g., RICHARD NELSON & SIDNEY WINTER, AN EVOLUTIONARY THEORY
OF ECONOMIC CHANGE 14 (1982) ("we reject the notion of maximizing behavior as an
explanation of why decision rules are what they are").
40. See generally W. BRIAN ARTHUR, INCREASING RETURNS AND PATH
DEPENDENCY IN THE ECONOMY (1994).
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competition the invariable mistakes that a centralized network planner
will make.
This hostility toward centralized, planned innovation should, for
Openists in particular, spill over to an attitude toward government.
Government, no more than any human entity, is likely to have a good
idea of what the future should be, so centralized technological planning
is no better option. But the developments in evolutionary economics and
post-Schumpeterian thought should direct Deregulationists to rethink
their argument. It cannot be denied that the unregulated companies
favored by the deregulation can become among the forces that resist the
new. The new work suggests that this is not only possible, but likely.
All of these teachings lead to a single principle that should be an
absolute policy consensus. Lost-cost market entry is the common
foundation of the innovation theories that both Deregulationists and
Openists subscribe to. That means preventing any single actor,
governmental or otherwise, from becoming lord of the technological
future. A multiplicity of innovating actors, even if suffering from the
same inability to accurately predict the future, may nonetheless stumble
upon the optimal path. But all should understand that the process will
be an ugly, Darwinian affair, an interminable exercise in trial and error,
and not the well-calculated elegance of monopolistic prophecy.
B.

VerticalIntegration & New InstitutionalEconomics

While the study of vertical integration may seem to be a technical
topic, it has become central to understanding the division between
Openists and Deregulationists, and what the possibilities for
reconciliation are. 4 ' For the work in this area proposes that the ends
favored by Openists-namely, the innovations commons--may be
reached by Deregulationist means. The analysis of vertical integration
has highlighted weaknesses in the Openist position. Strong opposition
to all vertical integration, expressed in the "open access" laws, has failed
to answer to the challenge implicit in examples of "good" vertical
coordination.
Why pay any attention to vertical integration at all? The specific
reason is the "open access" debate. Some Openists, early on, suggested
that the best means of preventing an erosion of the neutrality of the
network would be laws limiting vertical integration of broadband carriers
with Internet service providers. Keeping these two economic units
separate, suggested Lawrence Lessig and Mark Lemley in early work, is
41. A far better overview of this aspect of the debate is provided by Joseph Farrell &
Philip J. Weiser, Modularity, Vertical Integration, and Open Access Policies: Towards a
Convergence ofAntitrust and Regulation in the Internet Age, 17 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 85
(2003).
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likely to prevent content discrimination on the Internet. 42 The counterargument is by now familiar for those who follow the debate. First, as
Phil Weiser and Joseph Farrell reminded, vertical integration often leads
to important efficiencies.43 Second, as Jim Speta and others have pointed
out, broadband operators, even if vertically integrated, want to make
their product as valuable as possible and can therefore be expected to
provide their customers with wide access to content and services."
Weiser and Farrell express this as the "ICE presumption," a presumption
that a platform monopolist will "internalize complementary
externalities. ""

The literature has focused on a narrow but crucial question: how
likely is it that private firms will create an innovation commons when
that would be economically desirable? The answer begins by recognizing
that the value of a broadband operator's (or any platform owner's) service
ultimately depends on what applications and content it supports. The
value of a game console to a consumer is chiefly a function of the games
you can play on it (imagine an advanced game console that offered only
"Pong"). We ought therefore expect the broadband operator to do
everything possible to maximize the platform's value to its customers,
including the adoption of whatever strategies will lead to the best
environment for developing applications. For example, a service that
only allowed Comcast customers to email Comcast customers would be
less valuable, making it unlikely that Comcast would impose such a
limitation. Similarly, if an "open" application development model yields
the best applications, then the platform owner will provide an open
model.
There may also be services where vertically coordinated, "hand-inglove" cooperation results in more value for the customer. A car that
arrived with no speedometer or tachometer would be less desirable
despite the fact that the automobile and gauge market are arguably
separate. In the broadband context, Comcast might, for example, want
to offer its customers an integrated Voice-over-cable product. Doing so
might be better with vertical coordination between itself and a telephony
carrier. In short, some applications are better provided in a closed
fashion, and some open. What is better open and better closed is

42. See Mark A. Lemley & Lawrence Lessig, The End of End-to-End: Preserving the
Architecture ofthe Internet in the Broadband Era, 48 UCLA L. REV. 925 (2001).
43. See Farrell &Weiser, supra note 41, at 100-05.
44. See James B. Speta, A Vision ofOpenness by Government Fiat, 96 Nw. U. L. REV.
1553, 1565-66 (2001); James B. Speta, Handicapping the Race for the Last Mile? A Critique
of Open Access Rules for Broadband Platforms, 17 YALE J. ON REG. 39 (2000).
45. See Farrell &Weiser, supra note 41, at 101.
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ultimately an empirical question, 46 and one that the platform owner-the
argument goes--is best situated to answer.
But hold on: what if the platform owner is a monopolist--won't it
try to "leverage" its platform monopoly into a second monopoly? For
example, might a monopolist broadband operator begin to try and give
Here, for a
itself a monopoly over all Voice-over-IP revenue?
Deregulationist, the relevance of the "single-monopoly profit" principles
emerges. To a platform monopolist, the applications are its inputs, and
the monopolist has the same interest as any other party in minimizing its
input costs.4 7 Hence, if allowing open application development saves the
monopolist money, then it will do so. An example comes from
Microsoft, monopoly owner of the Windows platform. Microsoft does
not categorically bar any foreign applications, but instead integrates some
functions into the operating system platform (such as, say, disk
defragmentation utilities), and leaves others open to some degree of
competition (such as word processors). While the merits of Microsoft as
a model are debatable, the point is that even a monopoly platform owner
may find it a bad idea to make everything vertically integrated.
This analysis leads to a presumption that, in the
telecommunications market, vertically integrated companies, even with
monopoly power, should generally be left unregulated, absent special
conditions, or exceptions.4
But from both Weiser and Farrell's work, and from the evolutionary
economic work discussed above, there is an important reason to suspect
that platform owners may not implement optimal innovation policies
themselves. Weiser and Farrell call it the problem of "incompetent
incumbents."49 In the terminology of Nelson and Winter, it is the
observations that firms operate on the basis of routines that do not allow
for suitable decisional flexibility. Perhaps most simply: the clearest
problem is that no company will plan its own death, even if its death is in
the social interest.
The problem for policy-makers is this: when a platform owner
chooses a closed system, how can we know whether is it actually trying to
"internalize complementary externalities" or just trying to protect itself?.
Is the platform owner truly creating a better product (like a car that
46. Cf Douglas Lichtman, Property Rights in Emerging Platform Technologies, 29 J.
LEGAL STUDIES 615 (2000) (describing certain situations in which a platform owner might
choose an open platform).
47. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 177-78 (2d ed. 2001).
48. Farrell and Weiser provide a useful summary of the exceptions that have emerged
from the economic literature. Two are particularly relevant to the broadband context (1)
interests in price discrimination and, (2) interests in disadvantaging potential platform rivals.
See Farrell &Weiser, supra note 41, at 105-19.
49. Id. at 114-17.
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includes a speedometer) or is it, in Schumpeter's phraseology, "resisting
to new ways" in an effort to prevent its own inevitable demise?"
Effective competition will threaten the life of existing firms. As
Schumpeter put it, in a true capitalist system, companies face
"competition which commands a decisive cost or quality advantage and
which strikes not at the margins of the profits and the outputs of the
If
existing firms but at their foundations and their very lives."5 '
innovation presents a firm with a threat to its very existence, then its
interest in a dosed system may have much less to do with "internalization
of complementary externalities" than it does with basic survival.
For policy-makers, the best answer to this dilemma, I believe,
combines a program of education and regulatory threat. It is reasonable
to agree that certain applications may be more efficiently provided open
and others closed, and still see industry education as the primary
challenge. Policy makers should be suspicious of the premise that
internal processes of firm-decision will always or even often lead to good
decisions. There are many reasons, not all of which can be discussed
here, but one is that the information and signals that broadband
operators are exposed to can be biased. Equipment vendors have spent
years convincing broadband operators that great profits lie in capturing
the applications market for themselves. In my personal experience, Wall
Street analysts reward broadband operators in the short term for
announcing plans to move into the applications market without serious
analysis of the second-monopoly profit problem. Neither group has
much to lose from sending such messages but both operators and
consumers do. A vivid example came in 2000, when broadband operator
Enron announced bold moves into the Video-on-Demand market and
was cheered by financial and industry analysts (though obviously
punished later).5 2 In that case, the problem was not quite that the
operator did not understand the one monopoly profit rule; it seemed to
be that analysts did not seem to care.
This view sees industry education as paramount. One important
tool in this respect is the regulatory threat, which can be important as a
kind of signaling tool. 3 It can counteract information broadband
operators get from other sources. Notably, FCC Chairman Michael
Powell has taken steps toward such an educational policy. Powell has
encouraged broadband owners to guarantee the neutrality of the network

50.

SCHUMPETER, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, supra note 29, at 86.

51.

SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM & DEMOCRACY, supranote 27, at 84.

52. See Cecily Barnes, Blockbuster Tests Video Streaming, CNET NEWS.COM (Dec. 19,
2000) athttp://news.com.com/2100-1023-250126.html.
53. See Wu, supra note 2 (suggesting regulatory threat may force operators to consider
the value of openness).
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for their own sake as well as for that of consumers. His approach
challenges operators to respect four "Internet freedoms" of the Internet
consumer to guarantee a better network for all. 4 This message, if it
reaches operators, may balance the urgings of others, such as equipment
vendors and sometimes Wall Street, to seek a (unachievable) second
monopoly profit.
III. RECONCILIATION

In what is perhaps an excess of optimism I consider reconciliation
plausible. As the discussion above suggests, the insights of the Openists
and Deregulationists are not necessarily in tension. Consider that both
sides are basically interested in innovation and open market entry. The
Openists are principally concerned with ends (an open network), and the
Deregulationists, means (non-governmental methods). That suggests
room for agreement.
A.

Network Neutralit and the Model of Users'Rights

Based on the positions developed here, I believe neither
Deregulationists nor Openists should oppose well-drafted Network
Neutrality (NN) rules. Such NN rules are, ideally, users' rights to use the
equipment or attachments that they want, following directly the open,
deregulatory spirit of Hush-A-Phone. Neither side should have much
reason to oppose a rule that creates a right of users to use whatever legal
and non-harmful application "attachments" they want. NN rules, stated
otherwise, can do much to advance the joint Schumpeterian interest in
wide-open market entry.
NN rules are distinguished by creating rights in users. Rights, that
is, to attach equipment or access any application or content, so long as it
is not harmful or illegal. As a recent proposed rule reads:
(b) GeneralRight of UnrestrictedNetwork Usage. Broadband Users
have the right to use their Internet connection in ways which not
unlawful or harmful to the network. Accordingly neither Broadband
Operators nor the Federal Communications Commission shall
impose restrictions on the use of an Internet connection except as
necessary to: [prevent uses illegal under statute or uses harmful to the
network].SS

54. See Michael K. Powell, Preserving Internet Freedom: GuidingPrinciples For The
Industry, 3 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 5 (2004).
55. See Appendix A. This is the most recent version of regulations first proposed in an
exparte submission to the FCC by Tim Wu and Lawrence Lessig. See Tim Wu & Lawrence
Lessig Ex Parre Letter, Appropriate Regulatory Treatment for Broadband Access to the
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This distinguishes NN rules from competitor-centered rules like the
various state-law "open access" regimes, or the approach of § 251 of the
1996 Telecommunications Act.56 For example, the Portland merger
condition at issue in the original AT&T open access case creates rights
in ISPs, not users. 7
The attraction to Openists of an NN rule is perhaps more intuitive.
What is the attraction to Deregulationists? The key point is that
creating rights in users can and will serve deregulatory purposes.
American law is full of such deregulatory rights, economic and otherwise.
A good example is the rights created by the dormant commerce clause to
be free from discriminatory state regulation." A user-centered NN rule
9
is as deregulatory in spirit as Hush-A-Phone and Carter-Phone were.
It prevents government from acting as in the Hush-A-Phone case and
agreeing to regulations that block application or network attachment.
While less likely in recent years than in the 1950s and 1960s, the
possibility of such action should not be discounted, for the reasons for
doing so in the future cannot be predicted today. NN rules are, in short,
like other rights against government: a form of pre-commitment rule for
both government and industry. They prevent now what may be
temptations tomorrow.
In addition, the broadband industry and some Deregulationists may
be overlooking the extent to which NN rules prevent government from
blocking operatorentry into the application market. If the users have the
right to access lawful applications and content, that includes those
provided by the operator itself. NN rules prevent a quarantine--prevent
operators from offering competitive, vertically integrated applications
themselves. NN rules for these reasons have a value to the operator
industry that should not be minimized.
Finally, NN rules are, at bottom, rules designed to free market
entry, and should therefore be supported by those with Schumpeterian
leanings, which means nearly everyone in communications policy. The
NN rules create a structural bias that favors entry of any player, operator
or application, or equipment-developer, into the market for consumer
usage of the Internet. They are designed to make the Vonage story
repeat itself. Even if Vonage dies, the Schumpeterian will admit it will
have succeeded in bringing the network forward. The NN rules also do
Internet Over Cable Facilities, Notice ofProposedRulemaking, FCC CS Docket No. 02-52
(filed Aug. 22, 2003), available athttp://faculty.virginia.edu/timwu/wu-lessig-fcc.pdf.
56. 47 U.S.C. § 252 (2000).
57. AT&T Corp. v. City of Portland, 216 F.3d 871, 874 (9th Cir. 2000).
58. See, e.g., Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662 (1981) (discussing
the rights created by the dormant commerce clause).
59. See Use of the Carterfone Device in Message Toll Tel. Serv., Decision, 13 F.C.C.2d
420 (1968).
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not (as Christopher Yoo argues, discussed below) do anything in
particular to prevent "facilities-based" entry. If anyone thinks they have a
better idea than the TCP/IP protocol, they are free to build that network
and see how it goes.
One Deregulationist who has not overlooked these arguments and
the desirability of NN principles is FCC Chairman Michael Powell.
Powell has spoken powerfully on the normative desirability of "Internet
freedom," his phrase for network neutrality. "Internet freedom," he says,
means "ensuring that consumers can obtain and use the content,
applications and devices they want."6 ° Doing so, he says, is "critical to
unlocking the vast potential of the broadband Internet," and (in
Schumpeterian language),
"essential to nurturing competitive
innovation."
Powell's discussion of "Internet freedom" focuses also on users'
rights, notably, the four "freedoms" are:
Freedom to Access Content. First, I believe consumers should have

their choice of legal content.
Freedom to Use Applications. Second, consumers should be able to
run applications of their choice.
Freedom to Attach Personal Devices. Third, consumers should be

permitted to attach personal devices they choose to be the
connections that they pay for in their homes.
Freedom to Obtain Service Plan Information. Finally, and most
importantly, consumers must receive clear and meaningful
information
regarding their service plans and what the limits of those
61
plans are.

These principles advocated by Powell, while done as part of an
educational campaign, underline why Openists and Deregulationists
should find common ground in advocacy in user-centered network

neutrality rules. A shared faith in consumer choice and open market
entry augurs such a result.

60.
61.

Powell, supranote 54, at 12.
Id.
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Criticism ofNetwork NeutrahTy

While some Deregulationists, like Chairman Powell,. have endorsed
principles of network neutrality, many industry players and some
Deregulationists have mounted challenges to network neutrality
proposals. I suggest that these challenges are generally lacking in merit,
for reasons that follow.
The industry's most common challenge is this: while neutrality
might be an attractive goal, any neutrality regulation is a solution looking
for a problem. Such regulation or even a threat thereof, violates the
principle of PRimum Non Nocere (first, do no harm).62 At its worst,
network neutrality regulation might become a tool in the hands of
application developers used to block competition from broadband
operators. Imagine, for example, a rule that required FCC permission
before a broadband operator could offer any service beyond a basic
connection.
There are several problems with the Primum Non Nocere objection.
First, it simply raises a question of dueling baselines. The existing design
of the Internet is neutral. Why should it not be private entities who
follow the principle of "do no harm" before monkeying with the proven
strengths of the existing design? In this sense the slogan does nothing
but restate an underlying difference in visions.
Second, the objection relies on an anti-regulatory straw-man.
Because it is possible to imagine a bad network neutrality law, any
network neutrality regulation is suspect. Yet it is unclear how Chairman
Powell's or other's suggestions create the means for preventing
The cable industry, the leading
competition among applications.
exponent of the do-no-harm view, has very meager support for its claim
that a NN rule would block operator entry into the applications market.
Its sole support is a proposal from Amazon that could be read to bar
cable-operators from adding pop-up ads to web content.63 That's far
from a rule that prevents operators from entering the applications
market. And as discussed above, a NN-rule that creates user's rights will
give operators as much as anyone else a right to enter the applications or
equipment markets.
A more powerful challenge to network neutrality rules runs as
follows. It may be true that the basic, neutral Internet creates positive
externalities, like the electrical grid or other neutral networks. But the
metaphor is inapt for the following reason: the electric grid model fails to
62. See Owen & Rosston, supra note 19.
63. See National Cable and Telecommunications Association Ex Parte Letter,
Appropriate Regulatory Treatment for Broadband Access to the Internet Over Cable
Facilities, Notice ofProposedRulemaking, FCC CS Docket No. 02-52 (filed Feb. 21, 2003).
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take into account the possible need to improve the grid or infrastructure
itself and the creation of proper incentives to do so. As Howard
Shelanski puts the point, using roads as a metaphor: "at some point the
road needs to be improved and that work can be disruptive. So the
question is not one of never disrupting the flow of traffic, but of knowing
when to let cars run freely on the road and when to tear up the road to
64
make it work better."
This returns us to the "smart-pipe" discussion and the argument
that much innovative potential is trapped in the core of the network, a
point Christopher Yoo makes.65 Yoo argues that it is critical, in a market
with many vertical layers, that competition be encouraged at the layer
that is least competitive. As he states, "Application of the basic insights
of vertical integration theory reveals that markets will achieve economic
efficiency only if each stage of production is competitive."66 Looking at
broadband, he thinks that in the application and content market,
competition is robust and needs no favors. Yet he sees competition at
the physical layer (between cable and DSL) least vigorous and therefore
the most in need of freedom from government restraints. Network
neutrality regulation, in Yoo's view, would mandate dumbness and
therefore slow deployment of proprietary "smart" networks.6 7
According to Yoo, the answer is to allow or even encourage the
deployment of divergent proprietary, as opposed to standardized,
broadband networks. He sketches the possibility of consumers being
served by three entirely different and non-standardized broadband
infrastructures: "The first network could be optimized for conventional
Internet applications, such as e-mail and website access. The second
network could incorporate security features designed to appeal to users
focusing on e-commerce. The third network could prioritize packet
routing in the manner needed to facilitate time-sensitive applications
such as VoIP."
Yoo's conclusions are overstated and demand several responses.
First, it is unclear why Yoo believes that the existence of a neutral
Internet would be a barrier to "facilities-based competition," that is, the
market entry of entirely new network facilities.6 8 If an operator wanted
64. Howard Shelanski, Remarks at Silicon Flatirons Telecommunications Program
Conference, University of Colorado School of Law (Feb. 8, 2004) (transcript available from
the Silicon Flatirons Telecommunications Program, http://www.silicon-flatirons.org).
65. Yoo, supra note 8, at 42-46.

66.

Id. at 59.

67. Adam D. Thierer makes the same point. See Adam D. Thierer, Are Dumb Pipe'
Mandates Smart PublicPolicy? VerticalIntegratilon, "NetNeutralihT, 'and the Network Layers
Model, 3 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. (forthcoming Winter 2005).

68.

Cf Randal Picker, Entry, Access and Facihties-BasedCompetition, in AM. L. &

ECON. AsS'N ANN. MEETINGS (The Berkeley Electronic Press Working Paper No. 33, Apr.
29, 2004).
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to build an entirely new network designed, say, to offer voice services, it
is free to do so. The existence of the Internet for new facilities
deployment seems irrelevant. Indeed, Yoo seems to have it backward: if
the neutral network is no good for certain applications, that would drive
facilities-based competition, not inhibit it. A neutral network should be
expected to drive an efficient mix of shared and facilities-based
competition: those applications which can be run over the open network
will be, and for those that require entirely new facilities, new facilities
will be built. Much of the cell-phone networks, for example, were built
in the 1990s, and the Internet proved no barrier.
In fact the facilities-based competition that Yoo sees as ideal is our
present reality. The existing telephone network is Yoo's "prioritized"
network that facilitates a time-sensitive application, telephony, as are the
mobile-phone networks. Meanwhile, the cable television network is a
network specialized for 'one-to-many" video. Perhaps Yoo's point is that
these various specialized networks are likely to remain in our lives, but
that doesn't say much about how the Internet should be regulated.
Second, Yoo's premise that vigorous competition at every layer is
always better for the consumer is overstated. He downplays, to the point
of elimination, the basic economic benefits of standardization. And
when it comes to technology platforms or other areas of economic
development it is easy to envision scenarios where standardization means
less competition but is nonetheless socially beneficial, which impeaches
Yoo's premise.
Here is an intuitive demonstration of the point. Most people in the
United States speak a standard language, English. This undoubtedly
leads to some sacrifice. We lose, for example, the precision of German;
we lack the Chinese vocabulary for food; and we lose righteousness and
occasional elegance of the French language. But few would argue that
vigorous and ongoing competition for a standard American language
would clearly serve consumer welfare. It would be, instead, the Tower of
Babel.
The same observation holds for standardized technology platforms
such as the Windows operating system or the TCP/IP protocol, which
bring a variety of benefits for application developers and end users.
Application writers need only write for a single platform, for example,
and can expect to reach a much larger addressable market, thereby
justifying greater investments. End-users, given a single standard, share
information with ease. All of these advantages usually go under the
rough heading of network externalities, or the economic benefits of
standardization. Yoo is, in essence, failing to take seriously the benefits
of platform standardization in his product differentiation model. To be
sure, as with language, there are costs from uncompetitive platform
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markets. The result will in all likelihood be an inferior platform (for want
of competition), and the possibility of anti-competitive conduct. But the
fact that we face a balance of costs and benefits shrinks Yoo's point. We
are left instead with the empirical question: how valuable are neutral
standards and networks, and when are they worth a loss in competition
in the network?
Yoo and others who favor the encouragement of market entry
should in fact favor basic network neutrality rules. True enough, such
rules may slow some competition for the standards for the Internet's
basic protocols. But if that's truly the case, nothing in NN rules, prevent
flil facilities-based competition. And meanwhile NN rules facilitate
market entry on the standardized and highly successful network we do
have. These and other reasons should prompt those Deregulationists
opposed to network neutrality principles to ask whether they are on the
wrong side of the argument.
CONCLUSION

I've suggested here that reconciliation of the broadband debate is
plausible, but unfortunately that doesn't make it inevitable. A serious
contribution to this problem has come from the winner-take-all
approach of some of the groups on each side. The Internet Service
Providers have seemed committed to achieving full open access rules
through litigation, again showing that companies in fear of death turn to
lawyers with the same urgency that dying people turn to doctors. And
the cable industry, while it has laudably adhered to neutral practices
during the last period of intense scrutiny, still seems unwilling to agree
with a simple neutrality rule that would codify its existing practices and
do much to remove regulatory scrutiny. As this goes, it should be
recognized that the age of regulatory uncertainty surrounding broadband
will soon reach its first decade. That fact alone should prompt all
interested parties to seek reconciliation sooner rather than later.
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APPENDIX A:
DRAFT NETWORK NEUTRALITY RULE
§ 1. General Right to Unrestricted Network Usage. Broadband
Users have the right reasonably to use their Internet connection in ways
which are not illegal or harmful to the network. Accordingly neither
Broadband Operators nor the Federal Communications Commission
shall impose restrictions on the use of an Internet connection except as
necessary to:
(1) Comply with any legal duty created by federal, state or local
statute, or as necessary to comply with any executive order, warrant, legal
injunction, subpoena, or other duly authorized governmental directive;
(2) Prevent physical harm to the local Broadband Network caused
by any network attachment or network usage;
(3) Prevent Broadband users from interfering with other Broadband
or Internet Users' use of their Internet connections, including but not
limited to neutral limits on bandwidth usage, limits on mass transmission
of unsolicited email, and limits on the distribution of computer viruses,
worms, and limits on denial-of service-or other attacks on others;
(4) Prevent violations of the security of the Broadband network,
including all efforts to gain unauthorized access to computers on the
Broadband network or Internet;
(5) Serve any other purpose specifically authorized by the Federal
Communications Commission, based on a weighing of the specific costs
and benefit of the restriction.
§ 2. As used in this section,
(1) "Broadband Operators" means a service provider that provides
high-speed connections to the Internet using whatever technology,
including but not limited to cable networks, telephone networks, fiber
optic connections, and wireless transmission;
(2) "Broadband Users" means residential and business customers of
a Broadband Operator;
(3) "Broadband Network" means the physical network owned and
operated by the Broadband Operator;
(4) "Restrictions on the Use of an Internet Connection" means any
contractual, technical, or other limits placed with or without notice on
the Broadband user's Internet Connection.

